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Northeast Asia at the Center?
The Asia-Pacific has always been an im-
agined region in many ways. It is essen-
tially an ideational construct engineered 
by the epistemic community of business 
people, scholars and politicians who 
have been promoting the Asia-Pacific 
identity from the 1960s onwards. This 
is not to deny its realness, though. The 
Asia-Pacific region does exist, defined 
not only by verbal discourses, but also 
by very material economic, social and 
political links connecting the countries 
of the Pacific basin, although the den-
sity of those links is distributed very 
unevenly across the region. 
The vast and amorphous Asia-
Pacific is superimposed onto other 
entities that can be regarded as either 
its «subregions» or regions in their own 
right. Those areas are more compact, 
easily definable, and arguably more 
«real» than the Asia-Pacific, since they 
have stronger geographical and his-
torical roots. For all the advances of 
globalization, which shrinks distances 
and facilitates communication, ter-
ritoriality remains a crucial factor in 
international politics [Buzan&Waever, 
2003]. It is also true in the case of «the 
Pacific hemisphere», of which East Asia 
claims to be the central constituent part. 
Yet East Asia, although it is much less 
hazy and much more territorial than 
the Asia-Pacific concept, is no monolith 
and has its own subdivisions.
The most salient division is that 
between Northeast Asia and South-
east Asia. Which of the two takes the 
pride of place? Official Asia-Pacific/
East Asian discourses refer to South-
east Asia, collectively represented by 
asean, as «the fulcrum» and «the driv-
ing force» of region-wide multilateral 
cooperation and integration [Clinton, 
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2010a; asean Regional Forum, 2011; 
asean Plus Three Summit, 2009]. In a 
similar vein, many academics highlight 
the prominence of asean, resulting, in 
their view, from the Association’s capac-
ity to be a collective leader and institute 
norms governing region-wide politics 
[Bogaturov, 1997; Acharya, 2003].
Unlike Southeast Asia, whose geo-
graphical area almost perfectly corre-
sponds to the 10-country asean mem-
bership, the concept of Northeast Asia 
is less clearly defined. It is unanimously 
recognized that Northeast Asia includes 
China (the mainland and Taiwan), Ja-
pan, and Korea (both the South and the 
North). Beyond that it becomes less un-
controversial. What about Russia and 
the United States? Can they be regarded 
as Northeast Asian actors?1 I believe 
that they can, although their status in 
Northeast Asia should be designated 
as peripheral as opposed to the central 
position of China, Japan and Korea, 
the three nations forming the core of 
the region in terms of geography, as 
well as by virtue of their long-standing 
historical and cultural affinity2.
1 Apart from Russia and the United States, 
there is, of course, Mongolia which may 
or may not be seen as a Northeast Asia 
country. My view is that Mongolia does 
belong to the region in question, but is still 
too weak politically and economically to 
be a significant factor. That is why Mon-
golia is omitted here from further analysis. 
2 Russia’s and the U.S.’s peripheral position 
in Northeast Asia also results from the two 
nations’ transcontinental nature. Unlike 
most countries in the world, they are di-
rectly «resident» not in one, but two or 
more regions. Northeast Asia is just one 
Russia is, of course, territorially 
present in Northeast Asia and has been 
a major player in the region’s interna-
tional system ever since the late 19th 
century. The case of the United States is 
less obvious. It does not have direct geo-
graphic presence in Northeast Asia, but 
is extremely close to the region, thanks 
to the territories such as Alaska, Aleutian 
Islands, and Guam. This, among other 
things, considerably raises the U.S. expo-
sure to the threats and challenges origi-
nating from Northeast Asia3. Therefore 
America’s behavior in Northeast Asia is 
driven not only by the logic of a global 
superpower, but also by its concerns as 
a local «resident power». 
Having thus delineated the mem-
bership of Northeast Asia, what is its 
standing in the wider regional picture, 
especially vis-à-vis Southeast Asia? 
As noted earlier, official international 
discourse gives clear priority to ase-
anas «the driver» of regional processes. 
However, this may result not so much 
from asean’s inherent strengths as from 
the big powers’ unwillingness to change 
the status-quo under which Southeast 
Asian countries lead only for as long 
as major Northeast Asian powers let 
of the regions where Russia and the 
United States have vital interests. 
3 For instance, it is believed that Guam is 
already within range of North Korean mis-
siles [«North Korea is fully fledged nuclear 
power, experts agree», 2009]. Going back 
into history, it is noteworthy that a part of 
Aleutian Islands was briefly occupied by 
the Japanese during the Second World War, 
underlining the U.S. vulnerability to neigh-
boring Northeast Asian powers. 
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them do so. This is why Southeast Asia’s 
current centrality in the Asia-Pacific is, 
in a sense, a leadership «by default». 
Its heretofore substantial role is even 
described as increasingly a thing of the 
past, «an embedded Cold War artifact» 
[Calder, 2010, p. 5]. For all the asean’s 
diplomatic skills and achievements, 
it lacks material power to be the real 
center of gravity as opposed to North-
east Asia. The latter (even excluding 
Russia and the United States) generates 
over 80 per cent of East Asia’s gdp. It is 
significant that the Northeast Asian trio 
supplies the lion’s share of the foreign 
exchange reserve pool under the asean 
Plus Three’s Chiang Mai Initiative Mul-
tilateralization scheme – of 120 billion 
US dollars China, Japan and South 
Korea are collectively contributing 96 
billion dollars, while the asean’s share 
is only 24 billion dollars. 
Northeast Asia’s military potential 
dwarfs Southeast Asia capabilities. 
Suffice it to say that four out seven 
Northeast Asia players (the United 
States, Russia, China, North Korea) 
have nuclear weapons, while the other 
three (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) are 
all able to go nuclear very promptly if 
they make a political decision. Their 
formidable military capabilities, along 
with smoldering conflicts such as the 
Taiwan and Korea issues, make North-
east Asia one of the most explosive 
regions in the global international 
system. If a war breaks out there, it 
will shake the entire world. It is telling 
that when the Thai-Cambodian border 
dispute erupted in 2010 that was just 
one of many international headlines4 
By contrast, when South Korea and 
North Korea went at loggerheads in the 
same year, it sent shock waves across 
the globe. There is little doubt that 
strategic stability in East Asia and the 
broader Asia-Pacific region is mainly a 
function of the relationships among the 
Northeast Asian powers5. 
It is economic, political and strategic 
weight of Northeast Asia, along with 
its conflict-generating potential, that 
makes it the real center of gravity in the 
Asia-Pacific, and indeed places it among 
the most crucial world’s regions, on a 
par with Europe and the Middle East. 
Developments in Northeast Asia will 
increasingly shape international order 
in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
The Emerging Institutional 
Architecture in Northeast 
Asia and Beyond: A Game on 
Two Chessboards
Despite an array of powerful factors 
fuelling rivalry and conflict in Northeast 
Asia, the region has been witnessing 
developments that could lead it to much 
4 It is, incidentally, one more indication that 
asean has a long way to go to reach soli-
darity and security community, without 
which it can hardly claim to be «in the 
driver’s seat» of the Asia-Pacific multilat-
eralism. 
5 Some authors go even as far as to suggest 
that as few as three major powers of North-
east Asia –China, Japan, and the United 
States– determine strategic landscape in the 
broader Asia-Pacific [International rela-
tions theory and the Asia-Pacific, 2003]. 
144
Estudios Internacionales 170 (2011) • Universidad de Chile
more cohesion. One obvious trend is 
the emergence of multilateral institu-
tional architecture6. Up until recently, 
Northeast Asia completely lacked mul-
tilateral arrangements of its own. The 
U.S.-dominated San Francisco system 
of «hub and spokes» had long acted 
as some sort of institutional surrogate, 
but it is now being gradually dismantled 
[Aggarwal, Min Gyo Koo, 2008].
Although Northeast Asia is still 
lagging behind many other regions 
in building multilateral institutions, 
noticeable progress has been made 
over the recent years. There is a trend 
towards a two-tiered structure of mul-
tilateralism in the region. The first level 
is represented by the Six-Party talks on 
the North Korean nuclear issue, which 
were initiated in 2003, involving China, 
North and South Korea, Russia, Japan, 
and the United States. The nuclear 
problem has not yet been resolved, but 
the Six-Party process may potentially 
lead to a Northeast Asian regional or-
ganization to manage political and 
strategic security [Aggarwal, Min Gyo 
Koo, 2008, p.8]. In February 2007, 
the participants of the Six-Party talks 
agreed to set up five working groups, 
one of which was tasked to study ways 
to achieve «Northeast Asia peace and 
security mechanism». Despite periodic 
walkouts by North Korea, the Six-Party 
talks have already become a de facto 
permanent consultative mechanism in 
Northeast Asia, albeit with a mandate 
6 Here I use the term «multilateral» as des-
ignating a kind of inter-state cooperation 
involving more than two sides. 
still confined to issues related to the 
Korean Peninsula.
The second layer of Northeast 
Asian multilateralism is embodied in 
the trilateral cooperation of the «core» 
regional states –Japan, China and the 
Republic of Korea. Their informal 
trilateral summits have been regularly 
held since 1999, but until recently they 
took place on the sidelines of asean 
Plus Three meetings. December 2008 
saw a watershed event, when the first 
Northeast Asian summit was held on its 
own, attended by Japan’s prime minis-
ter, China’s chairman and the Republic 
of Korea’s president. The leaders signed 
an action plan for promoting trilateral 
cooperation and agreed to hold such 
meetings annually. So far, four summits 
of the trio have taken place. 
At their third meeting in May 2010, 
the three leaders adopted a blueprint 
for future economic cooperation, envi-
ronmental protection, and expansion of 
personnel and cultural exchanges. They 
also agreed to establish a permanent 
secretariat in South Korea starting from 
2011 [Japan-China-rok Trilateral Sum-
mit, 2010]. The sides are negotiating 
a trilateral investment agreement and 
studying a trilateral fta. It is expected 
that the study will be concluded within 
2011 and formal negotiations will begin 
in 2012 [Japan-China-Korea Summit 
Declaration, 2011; «Wen presents pro-
posal for economic cooperation with 
Japan, S. Korea», 2011]. 
More than 50 trilateral consultative 
mechanisms, including 17 ministerial 
meetings, are now in full operation 
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and over 100 trilateral cooperation 
projects in the economic and social 
fields, people-to-people exchanges, 
green growth, and disaster management 
are promoted [«China, Japan, S.Korea 
agree to further strengthen trilateral co-
operation», 2010]. Apart from official 
meetings, non-governmental forums are 
also held among the three countries, 
with participation from the academia, 
business, ngo s and mass-media.
To be sure, institutionalization of this 
trilateral interaction is still in its nascent 
stages. It is too early to speak of a new 
economic bloc born in Northeast Asia. 
However, the trend is clear. Necessary 
economic prerequisites are in place. 
China, Japan and South Korea have 
become crucial trade partners for one 
another. Their trilateral trade accounts 
for 17 percent of the global trade volume 
and 90 percent of the total East Asian 
trade [«A milestone & new starting 
point for China, Japan, rok», 2009]. An-
other major driving force is big business, 
especially in Japan and South Korea, 
which has a stake in economic integra-
tion and pushes for further development 
of trilateral cooperation.
For a trilateral economic grouping to 
come into being, it is critical that China 
and Japan come to agreement. The two 
biggest economies in Northeast Asia 
have to resolve their differences, particu-
larly on the issue of regional leadership. 
There are essentially only two options. 
They could decide on joint manage-
ment of the integration arrangement in 
Northeast Asia, as well as East Asia at 
large. Or else Japan might accept China’s 
economic leadership. The latter seems 
increasingly more likely, especially with 
China overtaking Japan as the second 
biggest economy in the world in 2010.
So far, it has been China that acted 
as the principal promoter of Northeast 
Asian integration. In 2002, Chinese Pre-
mier Zhu Rongzi proposed a plan for 
the trilateral free trade area. Japan was 
unwilling to support this plan at that 
time, fearing that it could strengthen 
China’s positions in the region. Howev-
er, after the Democratic Party of Japan 
came to power in 2009, Tokyo reversed 
its stance on the issue. Prime Minis-
ter Yukio Hatoyama emphasized the 
importance of East Asian integration, 
calling for an East Asian Community, 
with China, Japan and Korea as its col-
lective core. It appears that Hatoyama’s 
regional initiatives were not only his 
personal preferences, but also reflected 
interests of powerful sectors in Japan’s 
political and economic elites. Therefore, 
despite his resignation in June 2010, 
the idea of East Asian economic com-
munity, based on a China-Japan-Korea 
partnership, is likely to stay relevant for 
Japan, even if it means ever closer ties 
to China [Funabashi, 2011].
It is not clear yet how these two 
tiers of an evolving Northeast Asia’s 
institutional architecture will interact 
and relate to each other. The question 
is whether it would be possible for a 
more broad-based six-party grouping 
and «the Asian7 only» bloc to act in 
7 «Asian» here designates countries that 
belong to Asia both geographically and 
culturally. 
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concert. What if competition arises 
between them? For instance, what are 
going to be the implications if China, 
Korea and Japan would go beyond the 
largely economic and cultural agenda 
they currently pursue, advancing into 
political and security issues as well?8 
Would the United States and Rus-
sia feel marginalized if the trilateral 
partnership among Beijing, Seoul and 
Tokyo intensifies, with Washington and 
Moscow being kept on the sidelines?
One can put the question even 
more bluntly: What is the likelihood 
that the emerging China-Japan-Korea 
triangle would grow into a political 
alliance, with Beijing calling the shots? 
Economic reasons seem to be already 
in place. Japan and Korea are being 
increasingly drawn into the Chinese 
economic orbit. China has become the 
biggest trade partner for both Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. Their rela-
tions are characterized by asymmetric 
interdependence, with Japan and South 
Korea depending on China more than 
China depends on them. The recent 
global crisis has served to deepen this 
trend. China now accounts for 20 per 
8 So far, security agenda has been periph-
eral to the CJK process. Yet at the fourth 
summit in May 2011 it was decided to 
hold «Trilateral Policy Dialogue on Asian 
Affairs» within senior foreign officials’ 
annual consultation «in order to promote 
comprehensive, objective and in-depth 
understanding of each other’s Asian poli-
cies and contribute to peace and stability 
in the region» [Japan-China-Korea Sum-
mit Declaration, 2011]. It remains to be 
seen whether this mechanism will evolve 
into something substantial.
cent of Japan’s total exports and im-
ports, while just 13 per cent of China’s 
trade is with Japan. China share of 
South Korea’s trade currently stands at 
20.5 per cent, while China’s trade with 
South Korea is only 7 per cent of its 
total volume [Yul Sohn, 2010]. 
Meanwhile, America’s economic 
presence in the region has significantly 
decreased, although it is still quite no-
ticeable. The United States remains a 
key export market for Northeast Asian 
countries and a major source of vital 
technologies. Washington is seeking to 
promote its own neoliberal version of 
regional integration, which, although 
thus far with little success, attempts 
to challenge China-centered economic 
regionalism in East Asia. America’s strat-
egy is, in particular, based on the recently 
launched Trans-Pacific Partnership, as 
well as bilateral ftas, the most substan-
tial one to date being Korea-us fta.
However, even if the United States 
were ultimately to lose the competi-
tion in economic regionalism to China, 
this would not automatically entail 
the advent of Sino-centric political 
institutions in the region. Economic 
integration does not necessarily lead to 
stronger political (intergovernmental or 
supranational) arrangements. Indeed, 
when integration makes great progress 
in the economic area, member-states 
may deliberately constrain it in other, 
especially political, spheres, so as not to 
put their national sovereignty at risk. 
Even the European Union’s experience 
testifies to such a hedging strategy 
[Busygina, Filipppov, 2010].
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East Asian countries, including Ja-
pan and both Koreas, are well aware 
of the risks inherent in their high eco-
nomic dependence on China. Therefore 
they are seeking to offset such risks 
by maintaining political and strategic 
ties to the actors capable of balancing 
a rising China, especially the United 
States. Both Tokyo and Seoul have 
no intention of abandoning their alli-
ances with Washington. Indeed, they 
are even strengthening their strategic 
cooperation with America in some 
areas, as well as enhancing political 
collaboration between themselves [Ryo 
Sahashi, 2011]. There are reasons to 
believe that even North Korea is wary 
of growing China’s might and might be 
interested in the United States acting 
as a balancing force [see, for example, 
Lankov, 2010; Feffer, 2010].
Russia, although its regional clout 
is much less than America’s, can be 
seen as another independent player, 
performing a balancing function. That 
is probably why in 2003 Pyongyang 
insisted on Moscow having a seat at 
the Six-Party talks [Sevastyanov, 2008, 
p. 252]. In other words, the Six-Party 
process, and a prospective institutional-
ized mechanism with full American and 
Russian membership, might be viewed 
as a vehicle to maintain balance of 
power and prevent Chinese dominance 
in Northeast Asia.
The economic triangle of Beijing, 
Tokyo and Seoul could be transformed 
into a Chinese-led political bloc only if 
full-fledged China’s hegemony arrives, 
similar to what happened following the 
Second World War, when the United 
States used its predominance to build 
and manage a ‘Western’ institutional ar-
chitecture. Economic leadership alone 
is not enough for actual hegemony. 
Two other requirements are military-
strategic primacy and the recognition 
of hegemony as legitimate from lesser 
states [Alagappa, 2003, pp. 53-4]. It is 
clear that China does not meet these 
requirements as yet. Its military capa-
bilities are still no match to America’s. 
And in terms of moral and political 
legitimacy, neither Korea nor Japan, 
appear ready to recognize Chinese pri-
macy. To be sure, one cannot rule out 
the emergence of Beijing’s hegemony 
in the future. However, at present it 
seems unlikely.
In a nutshell, Northeast Asia is go-
ing to witness the evolution of a dual 
institutional architecture in the foresee-
able future. On the one hand, economic 
integration linking China, Japan and 
Korea will deepen and expand, which 
is likely to result in their economic 
community. On the other hand, this 
economic process will be paralleled by 
the development of political multilat-
eralism originating from the Six-Party 
talks, with the active involvement of 
the United States and Russia. Thus 
«the balance of institutions» is likely to 
emerge, whereby China’s influence will 
be pre-eminent in regional economic 
cooperation, but significantly diluted 
within the political multilateral ar-
rangement –a kind of Northeast Asian 
concert of powers. 
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Northeast Asia’s evolving institu-
tional architecture reproduces what 
has already been going on in the wider 
East Asia, where China-centered, exclu-
sively Asian and economically focused 
asean Plus Three coexists with the 
asean Regional Forum, asean Defense 
Ministers’ Meetings Plus Eight and the 
East Asia Summit that are character-
ized by more inclusive membership and 
security agenda.
Northeast Asia not just replicates 
this –it may well be becoming the most 
crucial part of Asia-Pacific’s institution-
al order. Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
that Asia-Pacific/East Asian multilateral 
institution building will succeed unless 
Northeast Asian countries form a viable 
system of collective cooperation and 
dialogue. Thus, a likely future scenario 
can be drawn up in which the Six-Party-
based «Northeast Asian concert9» 
would act as the primary core for the 
Asia-Pacific security and political coop-
eration, while in a region–wide context 
it is supplemented by arf, admm+8 and 
eas10. In a similar manner, the prospec-
tive China-Japan-Korea fta would 
9 Concert can be defined as joint manage-
ment of international affairs by great pow-
ers on the basis of certain common goals, 
values and interests. The concert type of 
international order combines elements of 
power balancing and elements of collective 
security [Alagappa, 2003, p. 55]. 
10 So far eas has been primarily concerned 
with economic, environmental and social 
issues. However, following the addition of 
Russia and the United States, the forum’s 
members expressed interest in giving more 
attention to strategic and security issues 
[Lavrov, 2011]
function as a center for the region-wide 
economic integration, enveloped by a 
multitude of bilateral, minilateral and 
multilateral arrangements in the Asia-
Pacific (see Figure 1). Evolving balance 
of institutions in the form of the dual 
regional architecture is part of soft 
power balancing in the Asia-Pacific, 
whose primary aim is to hedge against 
strategic uncertainties associated with 
the rise of China. 
What role, if any, could apec play 
in this institution-building scenario? 
Is it facing an unenviable prospect of 
being an odd man out in the emergent 
regional order? When apec was born 
back in 1989, it had no «peer competi-
tors» in the Asia-Pacific, except asean. 
Nowadays there is an alphabet soup of 
multilateral bodies in the region, and 
apec is just one piece in this puzzle. apec 
was, from the very beginning, supposed 
to be largely about trade liberalization, 
but on this front it showed lackluster 
performance and is now overshadowed 
by proliferating bilateral and minilateral 
ftas. There used to be talk of apec tak-
ing on certain political-security dimen-
sions as the most inclusive top leaders’ 
gathering in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, with 
the creation of East Asia Summit, and 
with the United States and Russia for-
mally joining eas in 2011, apec is going 
to lose this important status–related 
advantage. In fact, eas could be seen as 
more representative compared to apec, 
since it counts India, a crucial Asian 
power, in its membership. 
Nevertheless, apec may have at least 
two strong points. The first lies in its 
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genesis as an institution standing for the 
imagined and ideational «Asia-Pacific» 
versus more concrete, narrow and ter-
ritorial versions of regional coopera-
tion. Globalization was the huge fad of 
the 1990s. As its glamour faded in the 
2000s, so did apec’s, because the forum 
has always been seen as the main cham-
pion of globalization in the Asia-Pacific. 
With pendulum swinging now in favor 
of more territorial forms of integration, 
apec could help prevent this swing go-
ing too far towards closed regionalisms. 
apec’s liberal and globalization-friendly 
discourse, although being an intangible 
asset, still matters a lot.
apec’s other strength is related to 
its accomplishments in specific areas 
of functional economic cooperation 
and business facilitation, such as apec 
businesspeople mobility scheme. If 
apec continues making such «niche 
contributions», it will remain relevant 
and in demand even in the face of 
other competing institutions in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
eas
spt
cjk
apec
aptttp
bilateral ftas
arfadmm+8
Figure 1. Emerging balance of institutions in the Asia-Pacific: political concert of Asian and 
non-Asian Powers vis-a-vis China-dominated economic integration. 
Political and Security Dimension Economic Dimension
Key players
us, China, Japan, asean, Russia, India. 
Key players
China, Japan, us, asean
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Russia and the Asia-Pacific 
Cooperation
Despite having a Pacific coastline of 
16,700 miles, Russia is a late–comer 
as regards the Asia-Pacific regionalism. 
Due to the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
was shut out from regional coopera-
tion, having instead to rely on bilateral 
ties with few allies such as Vietnam and 
Mongolia. Following the end of the bi-
polar confrontation in the early 1990s, 
Russia strove to integrate itself into 
Asia-Pacific bodies. It quickly joined 
the region’s premier non-governmental 
forums, Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council and Pacific Basin Economic 
Council, in 1992 and 1994, respectively. 
Yet acquiring the apec membership 
proved much more difficult. For one 
thing, in the 1990s Russia’s share of 
Asia-Pacific total exports stood at the 
meager 0.4 per cent. This did not quite 
square with one of apec’s membership 
requirements that an applicant country 
should have substantial economic ties 
to the Asia-Pacific. Another hurdle to 
Russia’s membership was the apprehen-
sions of some among the smaller and 
middle-sized apec economies that the 
addition of another big country would 
weaken their positions and raise the 
risks of the great power domination 
within the forum. 
However, at the 1997 Vancouver 
summit Russia’s apec application was 
finally approved, along with Peru’s 
and Vietnam’s. Moscow’s bid was 
supported by the United States, China 
and Japan, thus deciding the matter. 
Not everyone was happy, though. For 
example, the former Australian Prime 
Minister Paul Keating made the follow-
ing remark: «Russia’s membership was 
supported by the United States in part, 
I believe, to atone for another bad deci-
sion –to expand nato to the borders of 
the old Soviet Union. This sent a signal 
to Russia that it wasn’t wanted as part 
of the European system. Instead it was 
offered apec membership as a consola-
tion prize in the Asia Pacific» [Keating, 
1998]. In Russia itself, the admission 
to apec was met with enthusiasm and 
as a confirmation of the country’s sta-
tus as an Asia-Pacific power. In 1996, 
Russia also became a dialogue partner 
of asean and a member of the asean 
Regional Forum. 
Despite joining apec and ARF, Rus-
sia, due to domestic turmoil, ceased to 
be a major factor in the Asia-Pacific 
during the 1990s. However, during Pu-
tin’s and Medvedev’s presidential ten-
ures, Russia managed to substantially 
improve its internal situation, enabling 
Moscow to embark on more pro–active 
foreign policies in the 2000s. The Asia-
Pacific region became and still remains 
one of the top priorities of Moscow’s 
external strategy. On the political and 
diplomatic front, Russia resuscitated 
the contacts with Pyongyang, while 
keeping good relations with Seoul. 
Most important, Moscow established 
a «strategic partnership» with China, 
both in bilateral and multilateral (the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 
formats. In addition, the Russian gov-
ernment launched a massive program of 
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state–funded investments in the social 
and economic development of its Far 
Eastern areas. The objective is not only 
to upgrade the economy and infrastruc-
ture but also to reinforce Russia’s geo-
political position in the Pacific. Russia’s 
more vigorous policy is generally seen 
in the region as a positive factor. Ac-
cording to such assessments, «Russia’s 
pragmatic neomercantilism…would do 
no harm to countries of the region or 
to the rising Asian regionalism. Prop-
erly utilized and implemented, it might 
actually help facilitate bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in Northeast 
Asia» [Taehwan Kim, 2008, p. 209]. 
One of the signs of Russia’s return to 
Asia-Pacific has been its involvement in 
the region’s key security forums. In 2003, 
Russia became one of the co-sponsors 
of the Six-Party talks. In 2005, Russia 
sought a membership of the East Asia 
Summit at its inaugural meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur, where President Vladimir Putin 
attended as a special guest. At that mo-
ment, the bid failed to gain consensus 
approval of the 10+6 forum. Yet, in 
2010 Russia finally secured the invitation 
to join the eas, along with the United 
States. In 2010 Russia also joined the 
asean Defense Ministers Meeting proc-
ess (admm+8). Thus Russia now holds 
membership of all the Asia-Pacific mul-
tilateral security-political bodies –apt, 
arf, admm+8, and eas. 
Russia views its involvement in the 
Asia-Pacific security forums as a kind 
of guarantee that its voice will be heard 
and heeded. Russia’s preferred model 
for the Asia-Pacific political order is 
a multi-polar concert system, where 
Moscow is one of the major players, 
along with Beijing, Washington, To-
kyo, New Delhi, and perhaps Seoul 
and Jakarta. The Kremlin emphasizes 
the role of the Six-Party talks as not 
only the diplomatic vehicle for North 
Korea denuclearization, but also as the 
mechanism for «the creation of reli-
able political and legal guarantees of 
security in Northeast Asia» [Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011]. 
Moscow’s strong commitment to the 
Six-Party talks is not surprising, given 
that Russia wields substantial geopo-
litical leverage in Northeast Asia, while 
in other regions of the Asia-Pacific its 
influence is much more limited. At the 
same time, Russia wants to see the East 
Asia Summit as an umbrella political 
grouping in the Asia-Pacific which 
could «integrate regional security 
agenda in order to promote strategic 
dialogue» [Lavrov, 2010]. 
While Russia has secured for itself 
full representation in the Asia-Pacific 
political institutions, in the economic 
arena its presence can be character-
ized as very modest at best. Russia 
accounts for roughly one per cent of 
the region’s total trade. apec remains 
the only regional economic grouping 
Russia participates in. Even with apec, 
Russia’s involvement has mainly been 
limited to attending gatherings at high 
political level such as Leaders’ summits 
and ministerial meetings. Russia has 
kept low–profile or been altogether 
absent in most of the forum’s practical 
activities and projects. For instance, 
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Russia became the very last member–
economy to join the apec Business 
Travel Card initiative in 2010 (as a 
transitional member). Yet Russia has 
been lately stepping up its involvement 
in apec. One reason is, of course, the 
hosting of apec-2012 in Vladivostok, 
which means that Russia has to act as 
the forum’s formal leader. Apart from 
that, it seems that Russia, as part of its 
broader shift in priorities towards the 
Asia-Pacific, is actually getting more 
interested in apec. This might give hope 
that Russia’s enhanced involvement in 
apec will outlast the Vladivostok events 
and continue beyond 2012. 
Russia remains one of the very few 
economies in the Asia-Pacific that have 
no free trade agreements in the region. 
Moscow clearly sees the danger of its 
increasing economic marginalization in 
the Asia-Pacific and seems determined 
to change this, even though Russia has 
not yet been admitted to the World 
Trade Organization (as of this writ-
ing in August 2011). The necessity of 
concluding ftas with the Asia-Pacific 
countries was emphasized by Presi-
dent Dmitriy Medveded during his 
visit to the Russian Far Eastern city of 
Khabarovsk in July 2010 [Medvedev, 
2010]. In 2010, Russia launched formal 
fta negotiations with New Zealand11. 
11 Russia-New Zealand trade is minimal, at 
the meager 230 million usd in 2010 [Rus-
sian Federal Customs Agency, 2011]. Yet 
it is hoped that an fta with the advanced 
economy of New Zealand will be path-
breaking and help Russia enter the ftas 
game in the Asia-Pacific. 
ftas with Vietnam and Singapore are 
also being studied. 
Russia’s institutional integration 
into the highly competitive Asia-Pacific 
markets will only make sense if it can 
identify and exploit niche areas where 
its economy has comparative advantag-
es. The most visible Russia’s advantage 
is, of course, its rich natural resources, 
especially hydro-carbons. Russia has 
been making great efforts to become 
a major supplier of oil and natural gas 
to the Asia-Pacific. The Eastern Siberia-
Pacific Ocean came online in 2010, 
bringing to the regional markets crude 
from inside Siberia, and more energy–
related projects are now underway. 
Even more ambitious projects are 
now under discussion to drastically 
expand Russia’s economic links with 
the Asia-Pacific. In particular, there 
is an idea, proposed by an influential 
think tank in Moscow, of turning 
Russia’s eastern territories, with their 
abundance of water, energy, arable land 
and timber, into a major producer of 
energy-consuming basic products, like 
grain, meat and paper, for voracious 
Asian markets. Foreign investment and 
technologies, mostly to be provided by 
the Asia-Pacific countries, are to play 
a crucial role in realizing this grand 
project [Karaganov, 2011]. 
Russia also seeks to play a major role 
in innovative and intellectual sectors of 
the Asia-Pacific economy. One of the big-
gest recent efforts in this direction was 
the creation of Far Eastern Federal Uni-
versity in Vladivostok in 2011, which 
consolidated several smaller higher 
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education institutions into what the 
Russian government wants to become a 
world-class research university targeting 
Asia-Pacific education markets. Moscow 
has allocated hefty sums of money for 
the development of the university. The 
university’s state-of-the art campus, now 
under construction, will serve as the 
venue for apec Leaders’ meeting and is 
expected to be inaugurated by them in 
September 2012. 
It appears that Russia’s preferred 
model of economic integration into the 
Asia-Pacific has similarities to Canada’s 
and Australia’s in that it seeks to com-
bine large-scale exports of natural 
resources with the strong emphasis on 
innovative sectors such as high-tech sci-
ence and higher education. It remains 
to be seen, of course, whether Russia 
will be as successful as Canada and 
Australia in pursuing this path. 
The success of Russia’s efforts at 
regional integration significantly de-
pends on whether it has support of the 
established Asia-Pacific powers. China 
is Russia’s main «strategic partner» in 
the region. However, it is doubtful that 
China will make it a priority to help 
Russia become the full-fledged member 
of the Asia-Pacific system of economic 
cooperation. China is quite content 
with having Russia as a reliable sup-
plier of raw materials and is interested 
in keeping this resource base to itself 
rather than facilitating Russia’s links 
to other Asia-Pacific markets.
Another major Asia-Pacific econ-
omy, Japan, although presumably 
interested in weaning Russia away 
from growing dependence on China, is 
unlikely to do much to assist Russia’s 
regional aspirations. This is, of course, 
mainly because of the ill-fated dispute 
over South Kuriles/Northern Territories 
still poisoning relations between Mos-
cow and Tokyo12. 
This leaves another Asia-Pacific 
power, the United States. Can it pos-
sibly be a partner for Russia seeking to 
expand its ties to the region? There is a 
good chance that it can. It is remarkable 
that of all the areas, where Moscow’s 
and Washington’s geopolitical concerns 
overlap, it is the Asia-Pacific where their 
interests are least conflicting and most 
compatible. Whereas in Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Russia 
and America are competitors rather 
than partners, they do not have irrec-
oncilable disagreements in the Pacific. 
Although Moscow’s influence in North-
east Asia has grown somewhat in recent 
years, it is still too weak to be perceived 
by Washington as an actual, or even 
potential, challenge. Russia’s central 
geopolitical interest in the region is to 
retain effective control over its Pacific 
territories, not to expand at the expense 
of others. This is well understood in 
Washington. It is also important that 
both Russia and the United States want 
to hedge against serious geopolitical un-
certainties stemming from China’s rise. 
Of note, in this regard, is a recent 
report on the prospects for Russia-u.s. 
12 For instance, Japan has been blocking 
Russia’s bid to join the Asian Development 
Bank ever since Moscow made an applica-
tion in 1997.
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ties prepared by a group of prominent 
Russian experts [Karaganov, Suslov, et. 
al., 2011]. They point out that under 
the Obama Administration Russian-
U.S. relations have markedly improved, 
opening up opportunities for setting 
a new bilateral agenda. The report 
emphasizes that Russia and the United 
States do not pose a danger to each other. 
They have to be concerned not with 
one another, but with other threats and 
challenges. Both Russia and the United 
States experience the diminution of their 
relative power in the face of «the global 
diffusion of power» and the rise of new 
ambitious players in Asia, especially 
China. This makes it necessary that Rus-
sia and the United Sates become close 
friends, even to the point of «selective 
military-political alliance in order to 
counter a wide range of new threats and 
challenges» [Karaganov, Suslov, et. al., 
2011, p. 4]. As the authors of the report 
indicate, the biggest regional challenge 
in global politics lies in the uncertainty 
of China’s future behavior [Karaganov, 
Suslov, et. al., 2011, p. 10]. Strategic 
alignment with the United States would 
allow Russia to feel more confident 
vis-à-vis China. America’s friendship 
and support will avert the possibility of 
Russia becoming China’s periphery and 
its client state, a development that could 
greatly strengthen Beijing’s geopolitical 
might, to the detriment of U.S. national 
interests [Karaganov, Suslov, et. al., 
2011, pp. 16, 19].
Although Russia and the United 
States have somewhat different ap-
proaches to North Korea, with Moscow 
favoring a softer line on Pyongyang and 
Washington taking a tougher stance, 
they have been working together in the 
Six-Party process. And their collabora-
tion can move beyond just denuclear-
izing North Korea, perhaps towards 
some concerted steps on building a kind 
of regional architecture that would be 
acceptable to Moscow and Washington. 
Both Russia and the United States face 
the risk of being marginalized if the 
Northeast Asian integration evolves to-
wards an exclusive Asian club of Beijing, 
Tokyo and Seoul. If China-Japan-Korea 
partnership becomes the principal re-
gional institution in Northeast Asia, it 
will hardly be a desirable outcome for 
Russia and the United States. Instead, 
they are both interested in the devel-
opment of a more inclusive version of 
Northeast Asian multilateralism origi-
nating from the Six-Party talks, possibly 
excluding Pyongyang, if it continues to 
show intransigence. This shared concern 
might spur Moscow and Washington to 
enhance their cooperation.
Russia has long been pushing for 
multilateralism in Northeast Asia. In 
2007, as part of the Six-Party process, 
Moscow became the chair of the work-
ing group on Northeast Asia peace and 
security mechanism. The United States 
has historically been less enthusiastic 
about Northeast Asian multilateral-
ism, relying on its bilateral alliances 
in the region. Yet, there are signs that 
Washington might reassess its stand. 
The hub-and-spoke system was only 
possible under America’s undisputed 
hegemony. Now that the era of the 
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U.S. political dominance appears to 
be nearing its end, the best option 
for America could be multilateral di-
plomacy, a concert-like order within 
which Washington might hope to be a 
primus inter pares. Influential American 
experts now talk about the need to 
create «a formal five-party mechanism 
for Northeast Asia», adding the United 
States and Russia to the existing tri-
lateral grouping of China, Japan and 
South Korea [Feigenbaum&Manning, 
2009, p.22]. Russia and Washington 
also have similar expectations for the 
East Asia Summit, wanting it to be-
come the Asia-Pacific’s main venue for 
discussing political and security issues 
[Lavrov, 2010; Clinton, 2010b]. 
Being non-Asian powers culturally 
and historically, Russia and the United 
States are naturally interested in pre-
serving the trans-Pacific dimension of 
the Asia-Pacific institution building. It is 
telling that Russian political and intel-
lectual elite are increasingly talking of 
Russia as «the Euro-Pacific power» as 
opposed to the «Euro-Asian» concept 
[Nikonov, Toloraya et al., 2010]. This 
implies that Russia wants to avoid ex-
clusive focus on the continental Asia, 
meaning China in the first place. 
apec, as the leading trans-Pacific 
institution, could become a good venue 
for promoting Russia’s and America’s 
common interests in the Asia-Pacific. 
So far, Russia-u.s. collaboration within 
apec has been largely non-existent. 
In fact, the two sides have missed the 
chance to take advantage of their succes-
sive apec chairmanships, in 2011 and 
2012 respectively, when they could have 
had more coordination and launched 
some joint initiatives. Yet, there are still 
plenty of opportunities for Russia-u.s. 
cooperation, both within apec and 
other multilateral arrangements. As one 
option, Russia might consider joining 
the u.s.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership 
initiative, especially given the fact that 
it is already negotiating an fta with 
New Zealand and studying ftas with 
Vietnam and Singapore (all the three 
economies are the tpp participants). 
This no doubt would be quite a bold 
move, particularly in the light of Rus-
sia’s still continuing wto-accession 
saga. Yet if Moscow decided to ask 
for the tpp entry and Washington ap-
proved, it might usher in a new era for 
Russia’s relations with the Asia-Pacific, 
as well as with the United States. 
Conclusion
The Asia-Pacific is in many ways an 
imagined region superimposed onto 
more territorial and historically rooted 
regions. Northeast Asia, with its huge 
strategic and economic potential, seems 
to be the most important of these. De-
velopments in Northeast Asia will in-
creasingly shape international order in 
the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Despite the 
presence of powerful factors fuelling ri-
valry and conflict in Northeast Asia, the 
region has lately been witnessing more 
cohesion and multilateral cooperation. 
Northeast Asia seems to be moving 
towards a dual institutional architecture. 
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On the one hand, economic integration 
linking «the core states», China, Japan, 
and South Korea, is deepening and 
expanding, which is likely to result in 
an economic community. On the other 
hand, this economic process is paralleled 
by the development of political multilat-
eralism originating from the Six-Party 
talks, with the active involvement of 
the United States and Russia. «The bal-
ance of institutions» is likely to emerge, 
whereby China’s influence will be pre-
eminent in regional economic coopera-
tion, but significantly diluted within the 
political multilateral arrangement, a kind 
of Northeast Asian concert of powers. 
Northeast Asia’s evolving institu-
tional architecture reproduces what has 
already been going on in the wider East 
Asia, where the China-centered, exclu-
sively Asian and economically focused 
apt coexists with the arf, admm+8 and 
eas that have more inclusive member-
ship and security agenda.
A likely future scenario can be 
drawn up in which the Six-Party-based 
«Northeast Asian concert» would act 
as the primary core for the Asia-Pacific 
security and political cooperation, while 
in a region-wide context it is supple-
mented by arf, admm+8 and eas. In a 
similar manner, the prospective China-
Japan-Korea fta would function as a 
center for the region-wide economic 
integration, enveloped by a multitude 
of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral 
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. On the 
one hand, the dual regional architecture 
reflects the underlying reality of China’s 
increasing economic weight, while, on 
the other, it is part of soft power balanc-
ing in the Asia-Pacific, whose primary 
aim is to hedge against strategic uncer-
tainties associated with the rise of China. 
In this emerging institutional order, 
apec could stay relevant as standing 
for more open and globalised «Asia-
Pacific» versus more closed and purely 
territorial versions of regionalism. 
apec’s other strength has to do with 
its achievements in specific areas of 
functional economic cooperation and 
business facilitation.
Russia has stepped up its involve-
ment in Asia-Pacific affairs and seeks 
to be a major player in the regional 
institution-building. Russia has secured 
for itself full representation in the Asia-
Pacific political institutions, but in the 
economic arena its presence is still 
minimal. To successfully integrate into 
the Asia-Pacific, Russia needs support 
from the established regional powers. 
The United Sates might play such a 
helping role, as the Asia-Pacific is a re-
gion where Moscow’s and Washington’s 
interests are least conflicting and most 
compatible. Being non-Asian powers 
culturally and historically, both Russia 
and the United States face the risk of be-
ing marginalized if the Northeast Asian 
(East Asian) integration evolves towards 
an exclusive Asian club. Russia and the 
United States are naturally interested in 
preserving the trans–Pacific dimension 
of the Asia-Pacific institution building. 
apec, as the leading trans–Pacific insti-
tution, could become a good venue for 
promoting Russia’s and America’s com-
mon interests in the Asia-Pacific.
